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The paper discusses the historical evolution of the legal right to conscientious 
objection to military service within the key institutions of the Council of Europe. It 
does so by examining the travaux preparatoire and legislative history of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, focusing on the intention of its drafters to 
incorporate into the scope of the treaty, a right to be exempted from military service 
on grounds of conscience. It further explores the activities of the Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in order to 
identify whether these bodies intended to expand the scope of the Convention to 
cover objections of conscience to the undertaking of military duties as a constituent 
element of Article 9 ECHR, protecting the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. Finally, the paper explores the European Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisprudence on the question of conscientious objection to military service and 
assesses the importance and impact of Bayatyan v Armenia, a landmark decision by 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights which finally placed 
objections of conscience to military service firmly within the scope of Article 9 of the 







For a number of years, the monitoring bodies of the European Convention on Human 
Rights [hereinafter ‘ECHR’] had been hostile to the idea that the right to 
conscientious objection to military service should attract the protection of the 
Convention. In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights [hereinafter ‘the 
European Court’] and the former European Commission on Human Rights 
[hereinafter ‘the European Commission’] had been reluctant in recognising a ‘right of 
conscientious objection to military service’ on the basis of an arguably erroneous 
textual interpretation of two provisions of the Convention, namely Article 4(3)(b) and 
Article 9 ECHR. This paper provides an in-depth textual analysis of these provisions, 
and criticises the admittedly quite sparse information of the debate which has 
accompanied their adoption. It then moves on to examine the practice of key organs 
of the Council of Europe and their means of approaching the question of 
conscientious objection since 1967, when the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe acknowledged, for the first time, that conscientious objection to military 
service shall be regarded as a right deriving from Article 9 ECHR. The final part of 
this paper focuses on the evolution of the jurisprudence of the Convention’s 
monitoring bodies from the initially restrictive interpretation of the Convention in 
Grandrath v Germany [a case concerning a total objection to both military and 
civilian service which gave an opportunity to the European Court to discuss the 
interpretative limitations posed by Article 4(3)(b) ECHR], to the landmark ruling of the 
Grand Chamber in Bayatyan v Armenia, where it was finally acknowledged that 
conscientious objection to military service is a ‘manifestation of belief’ attracting the 
protection of Article 9 ECHR. The paper concludes that the shift in the Court’s 
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approach and the recognition of conscientious objection to military service as a 
treaty-protected right signals the need for stronger legal protection of this right by 
States, and strict adherence to the standard-setting texts of the Council of Europe’s 
key institutions and human rights bodies.  
 
2. The textual restraints of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The right to be released from the obligation to perform military service on grounds of 
conscience has been recognised in the domestic legal systems of a small number of 
European States long before adoption of the European Convention of Human Rights 
1950, the main regional instrument for the protection of human rights in the 
European region. The European Convention was entered into force in 1950 with a 
view to give effect to certain rights found in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and create binding obligations for Member States. Whereas the aim of the 
Convention was the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the right to be exempted from military service on grounds of 
conscience was not clearly stipulated in the text of the Convention. It is worth noting 
that even in its present form, the only reference to ‘conscientious objection’ in the 
European Convention is found under the ‘forced labour’ clause contained in Article 
4(3)(b) ECHR, which concerns the ‘prohibition of slavery and compulsory labour’. 
Indeed, the right to conscientious objection does not appear in Article 9 of the 
European Convention, the provision protecting the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. A close examination of the travaux preparatoires of Article 9 
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ECHR reveals no reference or any statements relating to conscientious objection to 
military service at the drafting stage of the Convention.1  
 
Remarkably, from the drafting history of what became Article 4 ECHR, it appears 
that initially there was no intention by the drafters of the Convention to make any 
reference to conscientious objection in Article 4 ECHR.2 The travaux preparatoires of 
Article 4 ECHR do not appear to reveal – in great detail - the discussions on the text 
of the Convention in the drafting phase, but only give an indication as to what 
changes were made to the draft provision until the text was finally adopted.3 On 6 
March 1950, the delegation of the United Kingdom proposed an amendment on the 
preliminary draft prepared by the Committee of Experts on Human Rights, 
concerning the provision on slavery and force labour (draft Article 6). The proposed 
amendment by the United Kingdom was aimed at excluding ‘any work carried out by 
conscientious objectors’ from the scope of the prohibition of forced labour. The first 
draft which incorporated the formulation proposed by the United Kingdom reads:  
 
[…] the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ should not include: […] 
any service of a military character or service in the case of 
conscientious objectors exacted in virtue of compulsory military 
service laws. 4 
                                                            
1 European Commission on Human Rights, Preparatory works on Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, doc. DH (56) 14, 16 August 1956. 
2 D. Ch. Decker and L. Fresa, ‘The status of conscientious objection under Article 4 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, New York University Journal of Law and Politics, vol. 33 (2001), p. 
379.  
3 European Commission of Human Rights, Preparatory works of Article 4 of the Convention, Doc no. 
DH (62) 10, 15 November 1962, para 23, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_TP_Art_04_DH(62)10_BIL.PDF>, accessed on 2-1-16 
4 Committee of Experts, ‘Amendment to Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of the Committee’s Preliminary 
Draft Proposed by the United Kingdom’, doc. no. CM/WP 1 (50) 2, 6 March 1950, reproduced in 




Considering the above statement, it can be suggested that the only intention of the 
drafters was to exclude alternative service from being classified as a form of ‘forced 
labour’. Commentators suggest that a possible explanation for the British proposal to 
include an express mention of ‘conscientious objectors’ in the forced labour clause 
was based on the fact that the United Kingdom was previously involved in the 
drafting of what became Article 8 of the ICCPR where the British delegation 
submitted similar proposals and therefore wished to include the same in the drafting 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.5  
 
A second draft prepared by the Committee of Experts on Human Rights – the so-
called ‘Alternative B’ draft – contained more detailed definitions relating to the 
provisions as opposed to the first draft which resembled a more straightforward ‘list 
of rights’ for consideration.  Slightly amended, draft Article 5(3) provided:  
 
 For the purposes of this article, the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ 
shall not include:  
[…] 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Human Rights, Doc no. DH (70) 5, 5 March 1970, p. 9, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_TP_Art_04_CDH(70)5_BIL.PDF> accessed on 6-1-16 
5 D. Ch. Decker and L. Fresa, ‘The status of conscientious objection under Article 4 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, New York University Journal of Law and Politics, vol. 33 (2001), p. 
379.  159 European Commission of Human Rights, Preparatory works of Article 4 of the Convention, 
Doc no. DH (62) 10, 15 November 1962, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_TP_Art_04_DH(62)10_BIL.PDF> accessed on 7-1-16. 
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(b)  any service of a military character or, in the case of 
conscientious objectors, service exacted instead [replacing ‘in virtue’ in 
the British proposal] of compulsory military service laws.6 
 
When the amended draft was submitted by the Committee of Experts on Human 
Rights to the Committee of Ministers for their comments, the Committee of Ministers 
did not comment on the suggested provision on the prohibition of slavery and forced 
labour.7 
 
At the next stage of consideration, the Conference of Senior Officials examined the 
previous two drafts and proposed a single unified version. The updated anti-slavery 
provision as amended by the Conference reads: 
 
3. For the purposes of this article, the term ‘forced or compulsory 
labour’ shall not include:  
[…] 
b. any service of a military character or, in the case of conscientious 
objectors in countries where they are recognized, service exacted 
instead of compulsory military service.8 
 
This was the first time that the phrase ‘in countries where they are recognized’ was 
added to the text of the provision.  According to Decker and Fresa, who carried out a 
                                                            
6 European Commission of Human Rights, Preparatory works of Article 4 of the Convention, Doc no. 
DH (62) 10, 15 November 1962, para 10, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_TP_Art_04_DH(62)10_BIL.PDF> accessed on 7-1-16 
7 Ibid, excerpts from ‘Draft Convention adopted by the Committee of Ministers and submitted by it to 
the Consultative Assembly for an opinion’, p.13. 
8 ibid, text of the report submitted by the conference to the Committee of Ministers, p. 16. 
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systematic examination of the travaux preparatoires of both Article 4 and Article 9 of 
the Convention, there is no guidance as to why the drafters included this new 
phrase.9  
 
The final draft of what, by that stage, was ‘draft Article 4’ of the Convention, 
provided: 
 
3. For the purposes of this article, the term ‘forced or compulsory 
labour’ shall not include:  
b. any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious 
objectors in countries where they are recognized, service exacted 
instead of compulsory military service.10 
 
Before its final adoption, the draft was returned to the Committee of Ministers for 
further amendments; nevertheless the text of the provision remained unchanged. 
The wording of Article 4(3)(b), as described in the final draft above, was finally 
accepted during the Conference of the Senior Officials in 1950.11 According to the 
travaux preparatoires of Article 4, during the First Part of the Second Session of the 
Consultative Assembly in August 1950, Article 4 was not the subject of any special 
comments during the debate. The Convention was signed in Rome on 4 November 
1950.  
 
                                                            
9 D. Ch. Decker and L. Fresa, above n 2 
10 Travaux preparatoires of Article 4 ECHR (above n 6), excerpts from ‘Draft Convention adopted by 
the Committee of Ministers and submitted by it to the Consultative Assembly for an opinion’, p.13. 
11 European Court of Human Rights, Preparatory works of Article 4 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Doc no. DH (70) 5, 5 March 1970, available at 




Although conscientious objections arise as a result of a person’s beliefs (with belief 
recognised as a protected ground under Article 9 ECHR), Article 4(3)(b) ECHR was 
the only provision of the Convention containing a statement on conscientious 
objection. 
 
In conformity with the textual limitation it contains (‘in countries where [conscientious 
objectors] are recognized’), Article 4(3)(b) has been interpreted by the Convention 
monitoring bodies as not encompassing an obligation for Contracting States to 
recognise a right to conscientious objection to military service in their domestic 
legislation or any obligation to provide for alternative civilian service in lieu of military 
service. For these reasons, the text of Article 4(3)(b) ECHR has for a long time been 
regarded by the Convention monitoring bodies as an obstacle to the recognition of 
conscientious objection to military service as a manifestation of belief (religious or 
otherwise) deserving the protection of Article 9 ECHR. 
 
In response to the problems created by the way in which the drafters of the 
Convention had dealt with the question of conscientious objection to military service 
in the years following the adoption of the Convention, various attempts have been 
made by the organs of the Council of Europe, as well as by some EU institutions, to 
achieve the express incorporation of conscientious objection within the text of the 
Convention.  
 
In a 2001 recommendation, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 




[…] incorporate the right of conscientious objection to military 
service into the European Convention on Human Rights by 
means of an additional protocol amending Articles 4(3)(b) and 
9.12 
 
The Committee of Ministers rejected the proposal, referring to measures already 
taken up in Recommendation No. R (87)8.13 In particular, in its response the 
Committee of Ministers emphasised that  
 
[…] rather than elaborating an additional protocol amending Articles 
4, paragraph 3b, and 9 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, as suggested in the Assembly’s Recommendation, presently, 
it is preferable to make a sustained effort to implement the 1987 
Recommendation.14 
 
3. The European Union’s response 
 
Attempts to place the right of conscientious objection within the scope of Article 9 of 
the European Convention have also been made by organs of the European Union, 
and in particular by the European Parliament.15 In 1989, the European Parliament, in 
                                                            
12 PACE Recommendation 1518 (2001) exercise of the right of conscientious objection to military 
service in the Council of Europe Member States, text adopted by the Standing Committee acting on 
behalf of the Assembly on 23 May 2001. 
13 CoM Recommendation No. R (87) 8 regarding conscientious objection to compulsory military 
service, text adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 9 April 1987, at the 406th meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies. 
14 PACE, Reply from the Committee of Ministers on Recommendation 1518 (2001) adopted at the 
758th meeting of the Minister’s Deputies (26-27 February 2002), Doc. 9379, 1 March 2002. 
15 The European Parliament is one of the EU’s main law-making institutions, along with the Council of 
the European Union (‘the Council’). The European Parliament has three main roles. First, debating 
and passing European laws, with the Council, second, scrutinising other EU institutions, particularly 
10 
 
a resolution promoted by Barbara Schmidbauer (German social democrat MEP, 
1987-99), the European Commission16 and the Member States of the European 
Union were called ‘[…] to press for the right to alternative civilian service to be 
incorporated in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as a human right’.17  
 
The Schmidbauer resolution quoted above demonstrates the determination of the 
European Parliament not only to emphasise the need for a more effective recognition 
of conscientious objection as a Convention right, but also to enable a process of 
change to ensure that Member States incorporate minimum international standards 
in their domestic legislation. In the 1990s and before the enlargement of the 
European Union, three EU Member States adopted legislation recognising 
conscientious objection to military service and providing for alternative civilian 
service within their domestic legislation; Portugal (1992), Greece (1997) and Italy 
(1998). By 1998 all fifteen EU Member States had adopted legislation recognising 
conscientious objection, while the Member States that joined the Union during the 
2004 and 2007 enlargement had already adopted legislation prior to their 
accession.18  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the Commission, to make sure they are working democratically, and thirdly, debating and adopting the 
EU's budget, with the Council. See D. Judge and D. Earnshaw, The European Parliament (Palgrave 
and McMillan, 2008).  
16 The European Commission is the EU's executive body and represents the interests of Europe as a 
whole (as opposed to the interests of individual countries). The Commission's main roles are to set 
objectives and priorities for action, propose legislation to Parliament and Council, manage and 
implement EU policies and the budget, enforce European Law (jointly with the Court of Justice) and 
represent the EU outside Europe (negotiating trade agreements between the EU and other countries, 
etc.). For further information on the role of the European Commission see P. Craig and G. de Burca, 
EU Law: Text, cases and materials (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 32; M. Horspool and M. 
Humphreys, European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 62.  
17 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on conscientious objection and alternative civilian service’, Doc. 




The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which became binding on EU institutions 
and national governments when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 
2009,19 is the only regional human rights instrument that explicitly includes the right 
to conscientious objection to military service within the same provision protecting the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In this regard, Article 10(2) of 
the EU Charter provides that ‘the right to conscientious objection is recognised, in 
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of this right’.20 With its 
entry into force the Charter is, by principle, binding across all EU Member States 
when they implement EU policies and law, except Poland and the United Kingdom 
which have ‘opted out’.21 The Charter applies only when fundamental rights are 
affected as far as the implementation of EU legislation is concerned. Therefore, if a 
national authority violates fundamental rights protected under the Charter when 
implementing EU Law, the European Commission can take the matter to the 
European Court of Justice.22 When the issue at stake does not involve the 
implementation of EU legislation, then the Charter does not apply and the 
appropriate body that may address an issue is the European Court of Human 
                                                            
19 For academic commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, see D. 
Denman, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights’, European Human Rights Law Review, vol. 4 (2010), 
p. 349; J. Blackstone, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: scope and competence’, Justice 
Journal, vol. 9(2012), p.19; S. I. Sanchez, ‘The Court and the Charter: the impact of the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty of the ECJ’s approach to fundamental rights’, Common Market Law 
Review, vol. 49 (2012), p 1565.  
20 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (above n.Error! Bookmark not defined.), 
Article 10.  
21 Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland 
and to the United Kingdom, OJ C 306/156, 17 December 2007 available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0156:0157:EN:PDF> accessed on 10-1-
16 
22 J. H.H. Weiler, ‘Human rights: Member State, EU and ECHR levels of protection’, European Journal 
of International Law, vol. 24 (2013), p. 471. 
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Rights.23 The Charter is read in accordance with international and European human 
rights law which it draws its inspiration from.24  
 
The Charter is therefore an additional instrument providing human rights protection; 
the commitments undertaken by EU Member States under the European Convention 
on Human Rights are independent of their obligations under EU law. In this regard, 
there is an explicit condition for EU membership that all EU member states must 
have ratified the ECHR and must be members of the Council of Europe.25 Although 
the European Parliament did not achieve the incorporation of the right to 
conscientious objection in the European Convention on Human Rights earlier, the 
European Union managed to place the right to conscientious objection in its own 
human rights treaty for the protection of fundamental human rights several years 
later. The explicit acknowledgment in the EU Charter of conscientious objection to 
military service as a manifestation of religion or belief protected under the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion was a key development in European 
Union law.  
 
4. Activities of the Council of Europe’s monitoring bodies 
 
The first formal recognition of a right to conscientious objection to military service in 
the context of the Council of Europe predates the analogous recognition by the 
                                                            
23 European Commission, 2012 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(European Union, 2013), p.20, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-
rights/files/charter_report_2012_en.pdf> accessed on 10-1-16. 
24 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Opinion No. 4-2005: The right to 
conscientious objection and the conclusion by Members States of Concordats with the Holy See, 14 
December 2005, p. 4, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-
rights/files/cfr_cdfopinion4_2005_en.pdf> accessed on 10-1-16 
25 W. Weiss, ‘Human rights in the EU: rethinking the role of the European Convention on Human 
Rights after Lisbon’, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 7 (2011), p. 64.  
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United Nations. Resolution 337, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe [hereinafter “PACE”] in 1967 at the peak of the Vietnam War, is 
the first resolution on the issue of conscientious objection to military service adopted 
in the Council of Europe.26 In Resolution 337, PACE placed the right of 
conscientious objection to military service within the scope of Article 9 ECHR.27 At 
the time Resolution 337 was adopted, the Council of Europe comprised of eighteen 
member states, nine of which had already adopted legislation on alternative service, 
six had no legislation recognising the right of conscientious objection, and three 
(Iceland, Ireland and Malta) had no armed forces. The Parliamentary Assembly 
noted that 
 
[the right to conscientious objection] shall be regarded as deriving 
logically from the fundamental rights of the individual in democratic 
Rule of Law States which are guaranteed in Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 28 
 
The need to expand the protection of conscientious objectors in all members of the 
Council of Europe was subsequently expressed in Resolution 478 (1967) where the 
Parliamentary Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers instruct the 
Committee of Experts on Human Rights, a subsidiary body of the Council of Europe 
invited by the Committee of Ministers to give its opinion on draft legal and political 
                                                            
26 PACE, Resolution No. 337 (1967) on the right of conscientious objection, text adopted by the 
Assembly on 26th January 1967 (22nd Sitting). 
27 ibid, ‘1. Persons liable to conscription for military service who, for reasons of conscience or 
profound conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or similar 
motives, refuse to perform armed service shall enjoy a personal right to be released from the 
obligation to perform such service. 2. This right shall be regarded as deriving logically from the 
fundamental rights of the individual in democratic Rule of Law States which are guaranteed in Article 
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.’ 
28 PACE, Resolution No. 337 (1967), above n 26 
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texts produced by other bodies,29 to formulate proposals giving effect to the 
principles in Resolution 337 through either a legally binding text, i.e. a convention, or 
a recommendation to governments in order to facilitate the recognition of the right 
across the Member States of the organisation.30 
 
In Recommendation 816 (1977), PACE reiterated this position and recommended 
that the Committee of Ministers, first, urge the Governments of Member States, 
insofar as they had not already done so, to bring their legislation in line with the 
principles set out in Resolution 337 and Recommendation 816, and, second, to 
introduce the right of conscientious objection to military service into the European 
Convention on Human Rights.31 Nevertheless, the Committee of Ministers did not 
take any action with regard to the recommendations of PACE. 
 
Recognition of the right of conscientious objection by the Committee of Ministers 
came a few years later in Recommendation R(87)8 of April 1987 where the 
Committee called upon Members States to bring their national law and practice into 
line with the basic principles previously laid out by the Parliamentary Assembly and 
reiterated by the Committee of Ministers.32 In particular, the Committee echoed the 
recommendation expressed earlier by PACE in 1967, stating that: 
 
                                                            
29 The Committee of Experts on Human Rights was the predecessor of the Steering Committee for 
Human Rights (CHHD). For more information on the mandate and work of the Committee see 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1407039&Site=COE> accessed on 22-1-16. 
30 PACE, Resolution 478 (1967) on the right of conscientious objection, text adopted by the Assembly 
on 26 January 1967 (22nd Sitting). 
31 PACE, Recommendation 816 (1977) on the right of conscientious objection to military service, text 
adopted by the Assembly on 7 October 1977 (10th Sitting), Preamble, para 4(b). 
32 CoM, Recommendation No.R (87) 8 regarding conscientious objection to compulsory military 




Anyone liable to conscription for military service who, for compelling 
reasons of conscience, refuses to be involved in the use of arms, 
shall have the right to be released from the obligation to perform 
such service, on the conditions set out hereafter. Such persons may 
be liable to perform alternative service.33 
 
New momentum to the progressive recognition of the right to conscientious objection 
within the Council of Europe came from the events which took place in the territory of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”) in the early 1990s. The 
dissolution of the SFRY led at least 100,000 conscientious objectors and draft 
resisters to flee the region and request refugee status in other countries on the basis 
of their refusal to take part in the conflict.34 The escalation of violence in the region, 
coupled with the intention of several countries to deport conscientious objectors who 
fled their countries to avoid persecution35 meant that the Council of Europe was 
under pressure to adopt a more robust approach on the question of conscientious 
objection to military service.  
 
In Resolution No. 1042 (1994) dealing specifically with the question of deserters and 
draft resisters from the dissolved States of the former SFRY, PACE recalled its 
Recommendation No. 816 (1977) in which it had expressly classed the right to 
conscientious objection as a ‘human right’.36 
 
                                                            
33 Ibid, para 1. 
34 PACE, Resolution 1042 (1994) on Deserters and Draft Resisters from the Republics of Former 
Yugoslavia, text adopted by the Assembly on 1 July 1994 (23rd Sitting). 
35 Ibid, para 10. 
36 Ibid, para 7.  
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Against the background of the conflict which foresaw the secession of Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina from the SFRY,37 PACE noted that, despite the existence of a 
right of conscientious objection in the Croatian Constitution,38 Croatia had failed to 
recognise the right of conscientious objection in practice and severely punished men 
refusing to take part in military operations deemed by the international community to 
be serious violations of international law and a form of ‘ethnic cleansing’.39 It further 
called upon the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro to recognise in practice the 
right to conscientious objection to military service and declare an amnesty for 
deserters and draft resisters, and the governments of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina to give protection to all people fleeing the fighting and to refrain from 
drafting them against their will.40  
 
In the following years, the situation in the Balkans remained unsettled since the 
Croatian and Bosnian conflicts were succeeded by the war in Kosovo and the NATO 
bombing of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) which 
ended with the conclusion of an agreement between Kosovo Force (‘KFOR’), an 
international security force established by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 
June 1999,41 and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia on 9 June 1999. 
 
                                                            
37 S. Jansen, ‘The violence of memories: Local narratives of the past after ethnic cleansing in Croatia’, 
Journal of Theory and Practice, vol. 6 (2002), p. 77.  
38 According to Article 47.2 of the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, ‘conscientious 
objection shall be allowed to all those who, for religious or moral beliefs, are not willing to participate 
in the performance of military duties in the armed forces. Such persons shall be obliged to perform 
other duties specified by law.’ Official Gazette No. 56/90 of 22 December 1990 available at 
<http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/hr00000_.html>accessed on 10-1-16 
39 PACE Resolution 1042 (1994) (above n 34), para 8. 
40 Ibid, para 14. 




The turbulent situation in the Balkans during the 1990s and the large numbers of 
conscientious objectors fleeing the region in fear of persecution played an important 
role in bringing the question of conscientious objection at the forefront of the human 
rights debate in Europe. 
 
By the early 2000s, although the right to be exempted from military service on 
grounds of conscience was recognised in law and practice in many European States, 
and had progressively been recognised by the organs of the Council of Europe, 
there were no clear international standards or guidelines as to the actual scope of 
protection and the guarantees which States should adopt in order to make the right 
effective in their domestic legal order. PACE Recommendation 1518 (2001) was one 
of the first texts after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia that reiterated in more 
clear terms the standards on conscientious objection as first set out in Resolution 
337 of 1967, despite considerable variations with regard to the legal position of 
conscientious objectors across Europe.42 Recommendation 1518 was also the first 
text of the Council of Europe in which the Parliamentary Assembly called Member 
States to include in their legislation the right for permanent members of the armed 
forces to apply for the granting of conscientious objector status.43 
 
Even though PACE had attempted earlier in 1977 to influence the Committee of 
Ministers to enable the incorporation of a provision in the ECHR that would expressly 
recognise the right to conscientious objection under Article 9 ECHR, the Committee 
of Ministers had not taken any action in this regard. In Recommendation 1518 of 
                                                            
42 PACE Recommendation 1518 (2001) exercise of the right of conscientious objection to military 
service in the Council of Europe Member States, text adopted by the Standing Committee acting on 
behalf of the Assembly on 23 May 2001. 
43 Ibid, para 5. 
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2001, PACE made another attempt and recommended the adoption of some 
amendments to the text of the ECHR, which, in PACE’s view, would have allowed 
the European Court to extend the protection of Article 9 ECHR to cases of 
conscientious objection. In particular, PACE recommended that the Committee of 
Ministers call for an amendment of Article 4(3)(b) ECHR in order to ensure the 
applicability of Article 9 to cases concerning violations of the right of conscientious 
objection to military service.44 The proposal was subsequently rejected by the 
Committee of Ministers.45 
 
In addition to the obligation to recognise a right of conscientious objection for 
conscripts, the various organs of the Council of Europe have encouraged Member 
States to recognise the right to be exempted from particular military duties on 
grounds of conscience for professional members of the armed forces. In this regard, 
PACE, which had first foreshadowed this possibility in 2001,46 emphasised in 2006 
that the right of conscientious objection to military service does not apply exclusively 
to conscripts, but rather it applies to career servicemen and reservists on an equal 
footing.47 In this regard, PACE noted that, as of 2006, only two Council of Europe 
Member States – Germany and the United Kingdom – had procedures enabling 
professional soldiers to request demobilisation and discharge from the armed forces 
on grounds of conscience.48 In 2010, the Committee of Ministers adopted 
                                                            
44 Ibid, para 6: ‘The Assembly also recommends that the Committee of Ministers incorporate the right 
of conscientious objection to military service into the European Convention on Human Rights by 
means of an additional protocol amending Articles 4.3.b and 9.’  
45 PACE, Reply from the Committee of Ministers on Recommendation 1518 (2001) adopted at the 
758th meeting of the Minister’s Deputies (26-27 February 2002), Doc. 9379, 1 March 2002. 
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Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)4 placing emphasis on the right of professional 
members of the armed forces to leave the armed forces for reasons of conscience.49 
 
5. Early jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
At UN level, the UN Human Rights Committee had struggled for years to recognise 
the right of conscientious objection to military service as falling within the scope of 
Article 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion). Like the European 
Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
contained a forced labour clause in Article 8(3)(c)(ii) which included an identical 
reference to conscientious objectors, but no reference to a right of conscientious 
objection in Article 18 ICCPR. It was only in 1993 that the UN Human Rights 
Committee acknowledged that the right to conscientious objection to military service 
falls within the scope of Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the provision that protects the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. In General Comment No. 22, the Human Rights Committee 
expressed the view that, although ‘the [ICCPR] does not explicitly refer to a right to 
conscientious objection, […] such a right can be derived from article 18, inasmuch as 
the obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of 
conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief.’50 In 2004, the 
Committee recognised in its jurisprudence that failing to provide alternative service 
                                                            
49 Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)4 of the Committee of Ministers, prepared by the Secretariat in 
co-operation with the Chairperson of the Committee of Experts for the Development of Human Rights’ 
Group on Human Rights of Members of the Armed Forces (DH-DEV-FA) (Council of Europe, 2010). 
50 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, 
Conscience or Religion), 30 July 1993, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4. 
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for conscientious objectors had given rise to a violation of Article 18(1).51 The UN 
Human Rights Committee’s decision in Yoon and Choi v the Republic of Korea 
[2004] marks the first instance in which the UN Human Rights Committee expressly 
departed from the restraints imposed by the forced labour clause in Article 8(3)(c)(ii) 
ICCPR and pointed out that, while the right to manifest one's religion or belief does 
not as such imply the right to refuse all obligations imposed by law, it provides 
certain protection, consistent with Article 18(3), against being forced to act against 
genuinely-held religious belief.52  
 
Similar to the position of the UN Human Rights Committee which originally excluded 
the applicability of Article 18 ICCPR (right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion) in cases concerning conscientious objection to military service, the 
European Court of Human Rights had been failing to recognise, until relatively 
recently, that conscientious objection to military service constitutes a manifestation of 
belief falling under the scope of Article 9 ECHR. In a number of cases decided 
between 1966 until 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (and the former 
European Commission on Human Rights) preferred to avoid examining cases 
concerning conscientious objection to military service in light of Article 9 ECHR and 
assessed the applicants’ claims with reference to other Convention rights. This was 
largely due to a narrow and arguably erroneous interpretation of the reference to 
conscientious objection contained in Article 4(3)(b) ECHR as an indication of the fact 
that there was no obligation for Contracting States to recognise the right to 
conscientious objection within their domestic laws.  
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The origins of the problematic interpretation of the European Convention can be 
traced back to the case of Grandrath v. the Federal Republic of Germany, decided 
by the European Commission on Human Rights in 1966.53 The case was the first in 
which the Strasbourg bodies were called to examine issues pertaining to the 
question of conscientious objection to military service. Grandrath concerned a ‘total 
objection’, in that the applicant, a Jehovah’s Witness who claimed to be a religious 
minister, argued that his religious and conscientious beliefs entitled him to exemption 
from both military service and alternative civilian service.54 Although the domestic 
authorities had recognised the applicant as a conscientious objector and requested 
him to perform substitute civilian service, the applicant refused to undertake the 
civilian service he was offered and requested an exemption from alternative service, 
a request that was ultimately rejected by the domestic authorities. Before the 
Commission, the applicant complained of a breach of Article 9 ECHR; his complaint 
had two different but arguably inter-linked aspects. First, he claimed that his right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as protected by Article 9 would have 
been violated had he been required to perform a service that was contrary to his 
conscience due to his genuine religious conviction against military service; and 
secondly, that undertaking civilian alternative service would have restricted his right 
to manifest his religion as any service would not have allowed him sufficient time to 
perform his religious duties towards his community. 
 
The German government claimed that Article 9 ECHR did not foresee a right of 
exemption from military or alternative service on conscientious or religious grounds 
                                                            
53 Grandrath v Federal Republic of Germany, App no 2299/64, 10 Yearbook of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 626. 
54 Ibid, paras 9 and 31. 
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and that the development and administration of alternative civilian service for 
conscientious objectors was a question left to the discretion of the State parties to 
the Convention.55 
 
With regards to the aspect of the applicant’s Article 9 complaint, the Commission 
noted that the applicant had not alleged that the compulsory service would have 
interfered with the private and personal practice of his religion.56 In relation to the 
second question, the Commission considered that compulsory alternative service 
would allow the applicant sufficient time to perform his religious duties; therefore his 
right to manifest his religion would not have been impaired in those circumstances.57 
Most interestingly, the Commission held that, under the Convention, objections of 
conscience did not entitle a person to exemption from substitute service and that, on 
the contrary, Article 4(3)(b) foresees that compulsory alternative service may be 
imposed as a substitute for military service.58 Finding it superfluous to examine any 
questions of the interpretation of the term ‘freedom of conscience and religion’ as 
used in Article 9 of the Convention, the Commission examined the applicant’s 
allegation primarily on the basis of Article 4 of the Convention and concluded that 
Article 9, considered separately, had not been violated in the applicant’s case.59 
 
Having dismissed the applicants complain under Articles 9 and 4, the Commission 
decided proprio motu to consider whether the conduct of the authorities had 
breached the prohibition of discrimination contained in Article 14 ECHR, taken in 
conjunction with Articles 9 and 4, due to the fact that the applicant had not been 
                                                            
55 Ibid, para 10.  
56 Ibid, para 30. 
57 Ibid, para 32. 
58 Ibid, para 32. 
59 Ibid, para 33. 
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granted an exemption from both military and alternative civilian service, an option 
which, under domestic law, was open to Roman Catholic and Protestant ministers.  
 
With regards to the possible violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 4 
ECHR, the Commission concluded that the applicant had not been subjected to a 
treatment which was in any way less favourable than that accorded to ministers of 
other religious communities.60 This was due to the fact that the applicant’s religious 
ministry was not his principal occupation and that certain differentiations may be 
legitimate and not precluded by Article 14. Therefore the question whether 
differential treatment in respect of exemption from compulsory service had been an 
issue in this case could not be given a conclusive answer in relation to the 
applicant’s occupational status. 
 
In relation to whether there was a breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, 
the Commission unanimously concluded that there was no violation in the applicant’s 
case as it had already concluded that the service required of the applicant would not 
have interfered with the private and personal practice of his religion, nor would it 
have restricted his freedom to manifest his religion by teaching within his community. 
It was also found that as the applicant had not established that he had been 
subjected to a treatment which was in any way less favourable than that accorded to 
ministers of other religious communities the question of discrimination did not arise.61 
Finally, the Commission held that the question of discrimination should be 
determined solely in the light of Article 4 of the Convention and in this case could 
only arise from a consideration of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 4 of the 
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Convention. Nevertheless as decided earlier, the applicant could not be considered 
to have been the victim of a discriminatory treatment in the application of the relevant 
German legislation, and therefore, the Commission found no violation of Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 4.62 
 
Although it should be emphasised that the case concerned an objection to both 
military and civilian service, the case of Grandrath provided an early opportunity for 
members of the Commission to express their views on the relationship between 
Article 4 and Article 9 of the Convention. One of its members, Constantin 
Eustathiades, appended an individual opinion, noting that Article 4(3)(b) ECHR 
defines the notion of forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of the 
Convention and that this: 
 
[…] should not lead to the conclusion that Article 4(3)(b) excludes the 
applicability of Article 9 of the Convention in cases where such work 
as falls under the said paragraph (3)(b) affects one of the rights 
guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention […] in this respect and 
more generally in regard to the limitations laid down in Article 9(2) the 
margin of appreciation which is given to the Government concerned 
is extended as a result of Article 4, paragraph (3)(b) of the 
Convention.63 
 
Eustathiades’ note appears to reflect a more pragmatic interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Convention. Nevertheless, the individual circumstances of the case, 
                                                            
62 Ibid, para 40. 
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i.e. the total objection of the applicant to both forms of service (military and 
alternative) do not offer an opportunity to conclusively assess the Commission’s 
position on the applicability of Article 9 of the Convention in cases concerning 
conscientious objections to military service per se. However, the legacy of the 
decision in Grandrath is an important one, since reliance upon Article 4(3)(b) ECHR 
with a view to exclude the existence of an obligation for State parties to recognise a 
right of conscientious objection to military service in their domestic legislation, would 
subsequently stir up a heated debate on the reading of Article 4(3)(b) into Article 9 
cases. 
 
For instance, in X v. Austria the Commission acknowledged that the Austrian 
Constitutional Court had acted within its margin of appreciation by rejecting the 
applicability of Article 9 ECHR in a case concerning a Roman Catholic university 
lecturer convicted by a national court for his refusal to perform compulsory military 
service.64  
 
The applicant had complained of violations of his rights under Articles 9 and 13 
ECHR. The European Commission’s decision in X v Austria, although it makes no 
reference to Grandrath, echoes a problematic reasoning as the Commission took 
into consideration Article 4(3)(b) ECHR to find that a choice is left to each State 
Party as to whether or not to recognise a right to conscientious objection to military 
service and to provide for the possibility of alternative civilian service.65 As held by 
the Commission, the Convention did not prevent a State which has not recognised 
                                                            
64 X v. Austria, App. no. 5591/72 (1973) 43 CD p.161. 
65 Ibid, para 1.  
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conscientious objectors from punishing those who refused to perform military 
service. 
 
Similarly, in A v. Switzerland, decided in 1984, the Commission observed that in 
countries where compulsory service existed, the imposition of a penalty for failure to 
complete military service did not give rise to a violation of Article 9 ECHR since that 
provision did not require States to provide the option of alternative civilian service to 
conscientious objectors.66 The Commission invoked once again Article 4(3)(b) 
ECHR, and found that Article 9 ECHR was not relevant to the applicant’s situation, 
as ‘the Convention does not give conscientious objectors the right to exemption from 
military service, but leaves each contracting State to decide whether or not to grant 
such a right’.67 The same approach was followed in a number of subsequent 
cases.68 
 
However, whenever possible, the Court tried to avoid dealing directly with the 
question of whether Article 9 was applicable to cases of conscientious objection to 
military service, but rather preferred to examine claims brought by conscientious 
objectors under different provisions of the Convention.  
 
Thus, in Thlimmenos v. Greece the Court, whilst noting the need to reconsider the 
Commission’s case-law regarding the right to conscientious objection to military 
service in the light of present-day conditions, 69 decided to examine the case under 
                                                            
66 A v. Switzerland, App. no. 10640/83 (1984) 38 DR 219. 
67 Ibid, p. 223. 
68 See, in particular, Johansen v. Norway, App. no. 10600/83 (1985) 44 DR 155, p.162; Heudens v. 
Belgium, App no. 24630/94, Commission decision of 22 May 1995 and Autio v. Finland, App no. 
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Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR, rather than Article 9 taken on its own.70 
Similarly, in Ülke v. Turkey, the Court did not find it necessary to pursue its 
examination of the applicability of Article 9 with reference to the approach followed in 
Thlimmenos, and preferred to examine the case under Article 3 ECHR.71  
 
6. Turning point: Bayatyan v Armenia 
 
The long lasting debate over the recognition of the right to conscientious objection as 
a right attracting the protections of Article 9 of the Convention came to an end in 
2011. Bayatyan v Armenia, a landmark decision that was adopted in 2011, signified 
that Council of Europe Member States are no longer justified to prosecute individuals 
holding a genuine conscientious objection to military service and are, in fact, under a 
legal obligation to allow individuals with moral objections to perform an alternative 
civilian service that is compatible to their beliefs.  
 
The applicant in Bayatyan v Armenia was a Jehovah’s Witness who, following his 
refusal to perform military service due to his religious convictions, was charged with 
draft evasion and sentenced to two-and-a-half year detention.72 The applicant 
complained of his conviction for draft evasion relying on Article 9 of the Convention. 
He claimed that his refusal to serve in the army was a manifestation of his freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion and that his conviction amounted to an unlawful 
interference with this freedom.73 
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It should be noted that in 2003, shortly after the applicant’s arrest and conviction, a 
law on alternative service was adopted in Armenia recognising the right to 
conscientious objection.74 Nevertheless, at the material time when criminal 
proceedings were instituted against the applicant, the right to conscientious objection 
was still not recognised in Armenia and failure to perform military service carried 
heavy implications. 
 
The adoption of the legislation in question constituted the fulfilment by Armenia of 
one of the commitments undertaken at the time of accession to the Council of 
Europe. In this regard, in May 2000, in its report providing information as to 
Armenia’s application for membership to the Council of Europe, the Committee on 
Political Affairs and Democracy of the Council of Europe75 indicated that one of the 
commitments of the country with regard to human rights was ‘to adopt, within four 
years of its accession, a law on alternative military service and, pending the adoption 
of that law and within six months of its accession, to take measures allowing 
conscientious objectors to perform military service in non-armed units under the 
existing legislation and, on the occasion of its accession, to pardon conscientious 
objectors currently serving prison sentences or in disciplinary battalions’.76 
 
                                                            
74 Republic of Armenia, Law on Alternative Service, adopted on 12 December 2003, amended in 
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In examining the facts of the Bayatyan case, the European Court observed that, 
despite Armenia’s pledge at the time of negotiations for accession to the Council of 
Europe that it would, inter alia, pardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to 
prison terms, the applicant had not been pardoned and therefore he was not 
released from his prison sentence.  
 
The initial judgment was handed down by a Chamber of the Court in 2009.77 In 
examining the applicant’s complaint, the court found that the Armenian authorities 
could not be regarded as having acted in breach of their Convention obligations for 
convicting the applicant for his refusal to perform military service.78 This was not 
unsurprising, considering that a reading of the Chamber’s judgment reflects the 
customary position of the Commission and the Court as to the applicability of Article 
9 ECHR in cases concerning conscientious objection to military service. The 
Chamber thus following the established jurisprudence of the Court on the question of 
conscientious objection concluded that: 
 
[…] since Article 4(3)(b) clearly left the choice of recognising conscientious objectors 
to each Contracting Party, the fact that the majority of the Contracting Parties have 
recognised this right cannot be relied upon to hold a Contracting Party which has not 
done so to be in violation of its Convention obligations.79 
 
The Chamber held that Article 9 of the Convention did not in and of itself guarantee a 
right to refuse to perform military service on conscientious grounds and that it was 
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therefore inapplicable to the applicant’s case.80 It therefore held by six votes to one 
that there had been no violation of Article 9 of the Convention.81 
 
The decision of the majority of the Chamber endorsing the case law of the former 
Commission was met with criticism by one of the dissenting judges.  In her 
dissenting opinion, Judge Power emphasised the ‘dynamic and evolutive nature of 
the Convention as a living instrument’82 and noted that ‘the Court cannot but be 
influenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards and policy of the 
member states of the Council of Europe’.83 In this regard, she argued that the 
majority’s finding failed to reflect the almost universal acceptance of freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion within democratic societies that is recognised in 
both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on 
Human Rights,84 and went on to criticise the inconsistency of the Court’s findings 
with European standards on conscientious objection to military service.85 Judge 
Power concluded that 
 
[…] in view of the foregoing, it would appear that the majority's finding is 
not just incompatible with current European standards on the question of 
conscientious objection but that it parts company with the Court itself in 
                                                            
80 See also Bayatyan v. Armenia [Chamber] (above n.72), concurring opinion of Judge Fura, 
para.3:‘the existing case-law on conscientious objection is clear in as much as there is no right of 
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terms of the overall direction of the jurisprudence as discernible in the 
case law.86 
 
Judge Power then considered the question of ‘proportionality’ of the interference with 
the applicant’s right to manifest his religion, stating that ‘notwithstanding the 
lawfulness of a permitted interference with a Convention right, the Court retains its 
supervisory role in assessing the proportionality of any measure taken’.87 Having 
noted that that restrictions on the enjoyment of the freedom to manifest one’s religion 
or beliefs under Article 9 were permissible to reconcile the interests of various 
groups and to ensure respect of the freedom of belief, she noted that Armenia had 
not provided any justification as to whether a ‘pressing social need’ existed which 
justified the limitations imposed on the ability of the applicant to manifest his beliefs 
by objecting to perform military service88 and that, in the circumstances, the 
applicant's imprisonment for refusing to perform military service had not been 
necessary, thus the State had failed the proportionality test.89 
 
The case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the request of the applicant and in 
accordance to Article 43 ECHR. The Grand Chamber was called upon to reconsider 
the question of whether conscientious objection fell within the scope of Article 9 
ECHR.  
 
The Grand Chamber acknowledged that the Court had ‘never ruled on the question 
of the applicability of Article 9 ECHR to conscientious objectors, unlike the 
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Commission, which refused to apply that Article to such persons’.90 This, in turn, 
excluded conscientious objectors from the scope of protection of Article 9 ECHR. 
The Court explained that it was not convinced of the previous interpretation of Article 
4(3)(b) ECHR and indeed, its applicability in the current circumstances, but found 
that Article 9 ECHR was applicable in that the court had ‘no reason to doubt that the 
applicant’s objection to military service was motivated by his religious beliefs, which 
were genuinely held and were in serious and insurmountable conflict with his 
obligation to perform military service’.91 
 
Having found that Article 9 ECHR was applicable in the present case, and as a first 
step in finding a violation, the Grand Chamber was required to determine whether 
the alleged interference with the applicant’s right was ‘prescribed by law’. It was held 
that even though the applicant’s conviction was based on Article 75 of the then 
Criminal Code, which prescribed the penalty for draft evasion, at the time of the 
interference there was no law on alternative service in Armenia.92 The Grand 
Chamber held that it was not necessary to to resolve question of whether, in light of 
the changes in the domestic law since the applicant’s conviction and Armenia’s 
commitment to pardon conscientious objectors serving prison terms, the impugned 
interference was ‘prescribed by law’93 and proceeded to assess whether the 
measures in question had been ‘necessary in a democratic society’.94 In this regard, 
it noted that the requirements of ‘necessity’ or ‘proportionality’ of the measure in 
order to achieve one of the legitimate aims included in Article 9(2) implied the 
determination of whether the impugned measures pursued a ‘pressing social 
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need’,95 and went on to recall that, in assessing whether and to what extent an 
interference with a Convention right was ‘necessary in a democratic society’, the 
domestic authorities enjoyed a ‘margin of appreciation’.96 
 
The Grand Chamber specifically noted that: 
 
According to its settled case-law, the Court leaves to State 
parties to the Convention a certain margin of appreciation in 
deciding whether and to what extent an interference is 
necessary. This margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with 
European supervision embracing both the law and the decisions 
applying it. The Court’s task is to determine whether the 
measures taken at national level were justified in principle and 
proportionate.  
 
In order to determine the scope of the margin of appreciation in 
the present case the Court must take into account what is at 
stake, namely the need to maintain true religious pluralism, which 
is vital to the survival of a democratic society. The Court may 
also have regard to any consensus and common values 
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emerging from the practices of the States parties to the 
Convention.97 
 
In order to determine whether such consensus existed, the Grand Chamber set out 
to assess the situation within the Council of Europe in relation to the recognition of a 
right to conscientious objection and noted that, at the time of the alleged interference 
with the applicant’s rights, the overwhelming majority of its Member States had 
recognised the right in their domestic laws with the exception of Turkey, Azerbaijan 
and Armenia.98 
 
In light of the evolving consensus over the recognition of the right of conscientious 
objection and the adoption of legislation on alternative service by the Member States 
of the Council of Europe, the Court held that the margin of appreciation enjoyed by 
the domestic authorities was not as wide as it used to be but it was in fact narrowed 
by considering the acceptance and development of legal standards on conscientious 
objection both within the United Nations and the Council of Europe.99 The Grand 
Chamber specifically noted that: 
 
[…] almost all the member States of the Council of Europe which ever had or still 
have compulsory military service have introduced alternatives to such service in 
order to reconcile the possible conflict between individual conscience and military 
obligations. Accordingly, a State which has not done so enjoys only a limited margin 
of appreciation and must advance convincing and compelling reasons to justify any 
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interference. In particular, it must demonstrate that the interference corresponds to a 
‘pressing social need’.100 
 
The Court made reference to the relevant recommendations and resolutions of the 
Council of Europe, demonstrating the importance of these guidelines in safeguarding 
that Member States are not only recognising the right to be exempted from military 
service and assigned alternative civilian service in their domestic legislation, but 
most importantly the obligation to provide a legal framework in their domestic legal 
systems that is practically accessible and effective.101 
 
In parallel with developments within the Council of Europe, the Grand Chamber also 
considered the important developments which had taken place in recent years in the 
practice of other international human rights monitoring bodies, most notably the UN 
Human Rights Committee.102 In addition, the Grand Chamber noted that the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in 2000, expressly 
recognised the right of conscientious objection to military service in Article 10(2).103 
 
On the basis of these considerations the Grand Chamber concluded that the 
applicant’s conviction constituted an interference which was not necessary in a 
democratic society within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention.104 
 
As for the debated question regarding the relevance of the exclusion clause in Article 
4(3)(b), the Grand Chamber considered the travaux preparatoires of Article 4 ECHR 
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and concluded that ‘the clause relating to conscientious objection was intended to 
indicate that any national service required of them by law would not fall within the 
scope of forced or compulsory labour’.105 It explained that the sole purpose of Article 
4(3)(b) was to provide a further elucidation of the notion of forced or compulsory 
labour; therefore, it neither recognised, nor excluded a right to conscientious 
objection and should not have had a delimiting effect on the rights guaranteed by 
Article 9.106 Although the drafters’ intentions cannot be taken conclusively to 
determine the interpretation of a legal text,107 it was important for the Court to use 
the intentions of the drafters in conjunction with the incremental evolution of the 
Convention as a ‘living instrument’ to place the meaning of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion within a more contemporary setting. 
 
In a passage which undoubtedly constitutes a watershed in the Court’s case-law on 
conscientious objection, the Grand Chamber concluded that: 
 
[…] opposition to military service, where motivated by a serious and 
insurmountable conflict between the obligation to serve in the army 
and a person’s conscience or religious or other belief, constitutes a 
conviction of sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance to attract the guarantees of Article 9.108 
 
It may be argued that the paragraph quoted above sets a lower threshold for a claim 
of conscientious objection to attract the protection of Article 9 ECHR, since the 
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burden of proof lies with the applicant to demonstrate that there exists a serious and 
insurmountable conflict between the obligation to serve in the army and their beliefs.  
 
Having found that the right to conscientious objection attracted the protection of 
Article 9 ECHR, the Grand Chamber proceeded to consider permissible limitations to 
the enjoyment of the right in question. In this regard, the Armenian Government had 
argued that, had the Court deemed that the applicant’s complaint fell within the 
scope of Article 9, the applicant’s conviction [imprisonment] was in any case a 
legitimate limitation of his right to manifest his beliefs.109 
 
The Grand Chamber noted that the possibility of imposing limitations on the 
enjoyment of the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs is expressly provided 
in the second paragraph of Article 9 and that, as with any other so-called ‘qualified 
right’ under the ECHR, for any restriction to the right to manifest one’s belief 
(including through conscientious objection to military service) to be compatible with 
the Convention, it must be prescribed by law,110 pursue one of the legitimate aims 
listed in the qualifying clause, and finally to be justified and necessary in a 
democratic society. 
 
In relation to the second requirement, the Grand Chamber noted that the aims 
expressly recognised in the second paragraph of Article 9 are ‘public safety, […] the 
                                                            
109 Ibid, para 83. 
110 Koppi v. Switzerland, App. no. 23224/94, Reports 1998-II, p. 540, decision of 25 March 1998, para 
53 (legal basis in domestic law); Silver and others v. United Kingdom, App. nos. 5947/72; 6205/73; 
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protection of public order, health or morals, or […] the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others’.  
 
It is notable in this regard that, by contrast to the list of legitimate aims contained in 
the limitation clauses of other rights under the Convention, the list of limitation 
grounds in Article 9(2) does not include ‘national security’ considerations.111  
 
Finally, the Grand Chamber reiterated that any restriction to the enjoyment of a right 
must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the achievement of one of the 
legitimate aims.112 The Court went on to emphasise that the principle which entails 
that an interference must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ is embedded in 
Article 9 ECHR protecting the freedom of thought, conscience and religion and that 
‘this freedom is one of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ within the meaning of 
the Convention’.113  
 
The Grand Chamber then moved on to consider the Government’s arguments 
concerning the compatibility of the limitation on the applicant’s right with the 
Convention. Firstly, according to the Government, the interference was ‘prescribed 
by law’ in that the applicant had been convicted pursuant to Article 75 of the former 
Armenian Criminal Code which prescribed the penalty for draft evasion and that the 
provision in question had been both accessible and sufficiently precise.114 The 
Government further acknowledged that the right to conscientious objection was not 
                                                            
111 All other ‘qualified rights’ under the Convention, i.e. Articles 8, 10 and 11 ECHR, contain a 
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recognised under Armenian law at the material time.115 On whether the interference 
was ‘necessary in a democratic society’, the Government argued that exemption 
from compulsory military service would have been in breach of the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination and that the Government had acted in compliance 
with the requirements of the Convention by following the position of the Court up to 
the present date as established in its case-law, i.e. that Article 9 did not concern 
exemptions from compulsory military service on religious or political grounds.116 
According to the respondent Government, non-discrimination on the basis of religion 
or belief was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in order to avoid the unequal 
application of the law to people of different beliefs.117 According to the Armenian 
government ‘it would inevitably result in very serious consequences for public order if 
the authorities allowed the above mentioned sixty-plus religious organisation to 
interpret and comply with the law in force at the material time as their respective 
religious beliefs provided’.118 
 
In response to the government’s claim that the interference was necessary to protect 
public order and the rights of others, the Grand Chamber held that it did not find ‘he 
Government’s reference to these aims to be convincing in the circumstances of the 
case, especially taking into account that at the time of the applicant’s conviction the 
Armenian authorities had already pledged to introduce alternative civilian service 
and, implicitly, to refrain from convicting new conscientious objectors’.119 It however 
concluded that it was unnecessary to determine conclusively whether the aims 
referred to by the Government were legitimate within the meaning of Article 9(2), 
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since the interference was in any event incompatible with that provision on the basis 
that the interference with the applicant’s manifestation of his beliefs had not been  
‘necessary in a democratic society’.  
 
Emphasising the importance of religious freedom, pluralism in a democratic society 
and the scope of the ‘margin of appreciation’ in deciding upon the necessity of an 
interference with a Convention right, the Grand Chamber noted that, while the 
applicant had sought to be exempted from military service on the ground of his 
genuinely held religious convictions, the system in place in Armenia, i.e. forcing 
objectors to refuse to be drafted into the army and to risk criminal sanctions, failed to 
strike a fair balance between the interests of society as a whole and those of the 
applicant.120  
 
Furthermore, the Grand Chamber rejected the Government’s claim that the 
restriction on the applicant’s right to be exempted from military service was based on 
need to avoid discrimination between citizens of different beliefs. In this regard the 
Court expressed the view that the applicant had been ‘prepared to share the societal 
burden equally with his compatriots by performing alternative civilian service’.121 It 
further held that: 
 
[…] respect on the part of the State towards the beliefs of a minority 
religious group like the applicant’s by providing them with the 
opportunity to serve society as dictated by their conscience might, 
far from creating unjust inequalities or discrimination as claimed by 
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the Government, rather ensure cohesive and stable pluralism and 
promote religious harmony and tolerance in society.122 
 
The Grand Chamber further argued that the applicant had not refused to comply with 
his civic obligations in general, but he requested that he shared the societal burden 
equally with other Armenian nationals, by expressing the will to perform alternative 
service of public interest and for the common good.123 The statement of the Grand 
Chamber reflects the position of some legal theorists that are in support of the view 
that conscientious objectors are not in breach of their legal obligations towards the 
State since their objection entails an intention to be assigned alternative duties in 
replacement of military service, thus undertaking the performance of an alternative 
civil obligation. 
 
The Grand Chamber then turned on the meaning of ‘democracy’, stating that the true 
objective of a democratic society was to ‘ensure the fair and proper treatment of 
people from minorities and avoid any abuse of a dominant position’.124 According to 
the Grand Chamber, in the applicant’s case this would have been safeguarded by 
granting him an opportunity to serve society as dictated by his conscience.125 
Therefore, the Grand Chamber concluded that the conviction of the applicant for 
draft evasion could not be said to have been prompted by a pressing social need,126 
and that  the Armenian government had failed to provide convincing and compelling 
arguments to justify any interference with the applicant’s right to conscientious 
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objection under Article 9 of the Convention. The majority voted by sixteen votes to 
one in favour of finding a violation of Article 9 ECHR. 
 
As indicated in the above analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence in relation to 
conscientious objection to military service, prior to the Grand Chamber’s judgment in 
Bayatyan it was commonly accepted by the Commission that Article 4(3)(b) of the 
Convention excluded the applicability of Article 9 to conscientious objection cases. In 
the words of Nicolas Bratza, in order to escape from their ‘self-imposed straitjacket’, 
for a long time the Court had no other option than to rely on provisions other than 
Article 9 ECHR to provide some degree of protection to conscientious objectors.127 
Since the ground-breaking decision of the Grand Chamber in Bayatyan, reliance 
upon other provisions of the Convention is no longer absolutely necessary, and the 
right to be exempted from military service on grounds of conscience is now regarded 
in itself as an autonomous right falling under the scope of Article 9 of the Convention. 
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In Bayatyan, the European Court finally provided a ruling that acknowledged 
conscientious objection to military service as a right attracting the protection of 
Article 9 ECHR. Further to the Bayatyan judgment, the duty to enact legislation that 
is practically accessible has been reaffirmed by the European Court in its recent 
case law demonstrating that States are not only under a duty to adopt measures with 
a view to enacting legislation on alternative service, but also to ensure that the 
legislation eventually adopted is effectively protecting the rights of those lawfully 
exempted from the obligation to perform military service, including the right not to be 
discriminated on the basis of religious or other beliefs.128 
 
The judgment of the Grand Chamber in Bayatyan marks a turning point in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which expressly abandoned 
its previously restrictive interpretative approach. The case granted an opportunity for 
the Grand Chamber to revisit its position by elaborating on the use of the ‘living 
instrument’ doctrine to interpret the Convention, a doctrine used to enable the Court 
to creatively update the interpretation of a number of Convention Articles in varied 
situations.129. The acknowledgment by the European Court of Human Rights that the 
right of conscientious objection to military service is firmly set within the scope of 
Article 9 of the Convention denotes that the development of legal standards and 
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obligations on the right to conscientious objection under the Convention will continue 
to evolve rapidly. 
 
Legal obligations, either positive130 or negative131, translate to both contextual and 
specific measures to be taken by a Member State to prevent similar violations from 
reoccurring in the future. In a broader sense, these may include the duty to put in 
place a legal framework that provides effective protection for Convention rights; the 
duty to prevent breaches of Convention rights, including the duty to provide 
information and advice relevant to the breach of Convention rights; the duty to 
respond to breaches of Convention rights; and finally the duty to provide resources 
to individuals to prevent violations of their Convention rights. The decision provides a 
strong basis for the development of a framework of binding positive duties and 
obligations for states in order to provide a more effective protection to those 
objecting to the undertaking of military duties on grounds of conscience. 
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